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Abstract 
The purpose of this research was to gain a better understanding of how specific aspects 
of cognitive performance are influenced by operating in lethal environments with the 
aim of incorporating any helpful insights into the operations performed by human 
intelligence collectors.  Gaining a better understanding of any negative cognitive effects 
could enable leaders in the intelligence community to take mediating action resulting in 
a more efficient enterprise.  Simulating the cognitive processes expected to be at play in 
lethal environments was accomplished by utilizing a technique known as mortality 
salience that has been shown to induce specific psycho-social reactions in individuals.  
Cognitive performance was tested by using the simple reaction time, attentional 
switching, and Stroop tests of the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics 
(ANAM4
TM
).  Memory recall was tested by asking participants to recall categorized 
items after watching a video of a fictional intelligence source.  This study found 
mortality salience had a statistically-significant influence on certain aspects of executive 
function as well as memory recall and suggest the etiology of mortality salience effects 
are most consistent with modern understandings of cognitive bias.  As such, the term 
“mortality bias” is proposed for future investigations and explanations of the 
phenomenon.    
1 
Leading a More Effective Intelligence Community 
The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), an organization composed of over 
100,000 people across seventeen federal agencies, with an operating budget in FY 2012 
of nearly 54 billion USD, is a unique and complex enterprise of enormous importance 
(Director of National Intelligence, 2012).  Much of the work conducted within the IC is 
of a highly cognitive nature performed by personnel who have undergone unique 
training as intelligence collectors and analysts.  In many instances these personnel are 
required to work in extremely challenging, and potentially lethal, environments, while 
still collecting and analyzing information with the utmost accuracy.  Producing precise 
and unbiased intelligence is vital as, in many cases, it is filtered into finished 
intelligence products for subsequent distribution to our nation’s leaders.  Depending on 
the relevance, these finished intelligence products can be briefed to the president, 
Congress, or senior military personnel, who use it to formulate important decisions 
essential to maintaining the national security of our country.  
Because the mission of the intelligence community is to present accurate 
assessments of the various tactical and strategic situations facing our country, it is 
important that senior IC leaders fully understand any potential cognitive distortions 
influencing its workforce and develop and implement mitigating training regimes and/or 
corrective policy initiatives to address them.  With that in mind, the purpose of this 
dissertation was to investigate the effects of induced death awareness, generally referred 
to as mortality salience (MS), on certain cognitive or neuropsychological processes 
important to the intelligence-gathering process.  Additionally, given mortality may be 
an overriding concern in many intelligence-gathering operations, it is vital that IC 
2 
leaders know and understand how MS may influence both the process and individuals 
involved.  More specifically, this project explored MS induction effects on cognitive 
performance, to include attentional shifting, simple reaction time, and memory recall 
performance.  These are all important aspects of cognitive functioning critical to 
intelligence gathering.     
Mortality salience (MS), also known as death awareness, is a technique used 
almost exclusively by Terror Management Theory (TMT) researchers.  These 
researchers have historically used MS induction to initiate cognitive phenomena known 
to mediate cultural attitudes in those induced.  However, because MS is known to 
mediate elements of cognition, as well as being an obvious fact of life for personnel 
serving in combat zones, understanding more details of its potential effects on 
intelligence collectors is important.  Additionally, exploring the effects of mortality 
salience on individuals, and extrapolating these effects to intelligence collectors 
operating in lethal environments, could enable intelligence community leaders to more 
efficiently employ their workforce and potentially improve the overall interpretation 
and accuracy of tactical and strategic intelligence assessments. 
While MS provides an intriguing method for exploring some of the cognitive 
dynamics in lethal environments, the theoretical origins of MS within TMT have been 
called into question (see Kirkpatrick & David Navarrete, 2006).  Therefore this study 
will look closely at alternative theoretical foundations for MS.  As preliminary 
experiments have shown, MS produces reactions similar to those found in individuals 
with state anxiety (Gauthier, 2011).  The expectation that MS would inhibit attentional 
processes could be more effectively predicted by modern anxiety-based theories of 
3 
cognitive functioning such as attentional control theory (M. Eysenck et al., 2007).  
Attentional control theory asserts that anxiety generally impairs processing efficiency 
on cognitive tasks; therefore, it is logical to assume MS would negatively influence 
processing efficiency as measured by common tests of executive function, such as 
simple reaction time and cognitive switching ability.  
Furthermore, according to a meta-analysis conducted on the role of anxiety and 
threatening stimuli on memory bias (Mitte, 2008) higher anxious persons have an 
increased ability to recall personally threatening material.  Because human memory 
storage for information is limited, the findings by Mitte suggest that in situations 
involving personal threat, intelligence collectors may well have a memory bias toward 
information relevant to their own personal safety, versus information that may have 
greater strategic importance to senior military leaders.  For instance, consider a human 
intelligence source located in a remote Afghan village, where lethal IED attacks are 
common.  If the source divulges tactical information to intelligence collectors 
concerning the likely location of roadside IEDs, as well as information concerning 
enemy re-supply routes from Pakistan (which would be information more relevant to 
higher-echelon strategic planners) it is likely, based on Mitte’s findings, the collectors 
would exhibit a greater recall of the IED information because of its relevance to their 
own immediate safety.  The obvious and potential problem arises if intelligence 
collectors are better able to retain information more relevant to securing their safe 
passage back to their forward operating base at the expense of their ability to recall 
strategic information more important for answering national or theater-level intelligence 
collection requirements, for which they were originally dispatched to acquire.  If this is 
4 
indeed the case, a better understanding of these cognitive influences, which would 
essentially amount to a mortality bias
1
, could lead to mitigating procedures being 
implemented in environments where MS or death awareness is generally expected to be 
salient. 
Literature Review 
Terror management theory and mortality salience.  Terror Management 
Theory (TMT) is an experimental existential-psychological theory that seeks to explain 
overarching aspects of human motivation.  The theory asserts, during the course of 
evolution, humans reached a point of cognitive sophistication and self-awareness that 
eventually propelled them to contemplate the inevitable fact of their own mortality, 
subsequently causing extreme and paralyzing psychological terror (Greenberg, 
Pyszcynski, & Solomon, 1986).  This terror essentially proved so maladaptive to 
survival, humans developed psychological coping mechanisms that enabled them to 
“manage” its paralyzing effects.  These coping mechanisms are referred to as “cultural 
anxiety buffers,” and are constructed of two main components (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). 
The first component of the cultural anxiety buffer addresses a need to blanket 
oneself in a cultural worldview in the belief that doing so better enables one to outlive 
their biological body and gain some degree of symbolic immortality (Solomon, 
Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 2004).  These worldviews can generally be thought of as 
                                                 
1
 Based on the theoretical assertions by Haselton et al. (2007) whereby they conclude that cognitive 
biases are adaptive from an evolutionary standpoint, a mortality bias would seem to have been 
extraordinarily helpful to humans in an ancestral environment by helping distance out-group members 
from access to valuable and scarce resources or by subconsciously increasing in-group coalitional activity 
in an attempt to mitigate potentially lethal threats. 
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overarching cultural paradigms, such as “Catholic,” “Jewish,” “Communist,” 
“American,” “Asian,” or “Conservative,” among others, to include all the standards and 
values associated with them.  The originators of TMT asserted that fusing with a 
cultural tradition provided individuals a degree of psychological succor by allowing 
them the ability to live as long as their tradition endured.  They also proposed 
accumulating great wealth, or building vast monuments to one’s life, would be possible 
approaches one could use to further increase the likelihood of symbolic immortality, 
especially in the event a specific organized religion or believe system, offering an 
immortal afterlife, was either insufficient or unavailable (Solomon et al., 2004).
2
 
The second component of the cultural anxiety buffer deals with the extent to 
which individuals believe they are meeting the standards of their inculcated paradigm, 
as measured by the concept of self-esteem.  In other words, a high self-esteem is 
generally indicative of an individual’s success in meeting the implicit and explicit tenets 
of their cultural paradigm, and, according to TMT, a sign one is on the correct path to 
successfully fusing with their paradigm and gaining immortality along with it.
3
  For 
TMT, “…self-esteem consists of the belief that one is a person of value in a world of 
meaning, and the primary function of self-esteem is to buffer anxiety, especially anxiety 
engendered by the uniquely human awareness of death” (Solomon et al., 2004).  
                                                 
2
 Most researchers of evolutionary sexual selection theory would argue that attempts to accumulate vast 
wealth or build monuments (especially by men) are essentially only efforts to signal their biological 
fitness to potential mates.   
 
3
 It should be noted that a high self-esteem as described in TMT is different than the concept of 
“resilience” currently used by the US Army to train soldiers to manage stress resulting from situations 
involving combat or deployment.  Whereas self-esteem in TMT relates to how well a person is 
successfully inculcating the tenets of their worldview, resilience refers to the ability to operate under 
stressful situations and quickly recover after stressful episodes and resume to a normative behavioral 
baseline.  
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TMT researchers have relied heavily on the concept of mortality salience (MS) 
to test their ideas concerning the aforementioned cultural anxiety buffers.  MS is a 
psychological technique used in TMT clinical research to prime individuals with death 
awareness.  In general, inducing an individual with mortality salience increases their 
propensity to ascribe positive evaluations toward their own worldview, as well as others 
possessing a similar cultural paradigm.  Conversely, it generally increases their 
propensity to have negative reactions toward dissimilar worldviews, or those associated 
with them, (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland, & Lyon, 
1990).   
Priming individuals with death awareness has provided TMT researchers a tool 
with which to test major tenets of their theory.  One such tenet includes the notion that 
death awareness is so mal-adaptive to human cognitive functioning, the brain evolved 
mechanisms to mitigate the “terror” it hypothetically produces.  TMT asserts the mind’s 
mitigation efforts work consciously, through proximal defenses, and subconsciously, 
through cognitive operations known as distal defenses.  Conscious proximal defenses 
involve rationalizing instances of MS and are manifest by efforts to deny any 
vulnerability to death.  However, the automatic transfer of death awareness into the 
subconscious mind where distal defenses can operate is also hypothesized.  According 
to the theory, distal defenses work by bolstering one’s self-esteem or cultural 
worldview, or by influencing the individual to denigrate the cultural worldviews of out-
groups (Pyszcznski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). 
During MS induction experiments, researchers have generally found, 
immediately after MS induction, subjects must be given a quick distraction exercise 
7 
such as a crossword puzzle, in order for the mediating effects of distal MS to manifest 
(Burke, Martens & Faucher, 2010).  TMT theorists explain, without the distraction 
exercise, death awareness stays in one’s focal consciousness where, again, proximal 
defenses work to dismiss or rationalize the exposure.  Distraction exercises, according 
to TMT, allow the salience of one’s mortality to bypass proximal defenses and enter 
into the subconscious where distal defenses are initiated. 
In lieu of TMT: Coalition psychology and evolutionary leadership theory.  
In the last decade, criticism of TMT and its particular use of evolutionary theory has 
steadily grown.  Researchers Lee Kirkpatrick and Carlos David Navarrete (2006) 
published one of the first critiques of TMT’s theoretical foundations by advancing a 
cogent argument that highlighted several inconsistencies inherent in its use of 
evolutionary theory.  Specifically, the authors took exception to TMT’s reliance on the 
idea of an evolved “survival instinct” being an inherent part of human nature.  They 
pointed out that the survival instinct is a notion that was largely disavowed by 
Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness, which takes into account both human and other 
species’ engagement in altruism as a means to more efficiently guarantee an 
individual’s transmission of genes to subsequent generations (Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 
2006). 
In addition, Kirkpatrick & Navarrete highlighted the fact that an incapacitating 
fear of death could not possibly have been a result of evolution because it would likely 
never have been adaptive in the first place.  Further, even in the event that a fear of 
death might have been an adaptive trait before becoming maladaptive, it is highly 
unlikely that humans would have evolved a corresponding psychological death terror 
8 
mitigation system in order to neutralize any paralyzing death terror.  To put it more 
simply, natural selection would have likely selected out those humans who experienced 
paralyzing terror and favored those who did not.  There would have been no need for an 
alternative psychological system to evolve in order to replace one that had become 
maladaptive (Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006). 
In lieu of a psychological theory (i.e. TMT) requiring either world-view 
buffering or anxiety-reducing reactions to MS, Kirkpatrick and Navarrete (2006) 
proposed a more parsimonious explanation for the effects of death awareness, which 
they refer to as “coalitional psychology.”  Coalitional psychology comprises the study 
of an adapted series of behaviors that the authors propose would have been beneficial to 
humans facing putative threats in their ancestral environment, including attacks from 
wild animals or rival bands, epidemic illness and famine.   
Coalition psychology proposes that the enormous benefits derived from 
coordinated social actions among individuals in groups, especially with regard to 
responses to crisis situations, would have likely led the process of evolution to favor 
individuals with psychological traits beneficial to coalition formation and allegiance 
maintenance.  Therefore, given the above discussion, coalition psychology more 
precisely explains the effects of mortality salience as a set of adapted responses to 
potentially lethal threats.  These responses increase the cohesiveness among group 
members, while at the same time, increasing the likelihood out-group members will be 
identified through any distinct physical or cultural differences they may possess 
(Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006).
4
 
                                                 
4
 Mark Pagel, in his book, Wired for Culture: Origins of the Human Social Mind, is also supportive of 
this line of thought noting that the development of culture essentially served/s as a biological strategy that 
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Navarrete et al. (2004) also provide an alternative explanation for the role of self-
esteem in moderating the effects of MS induction, which is seemingly more consistent 
with the tenets of modern evolutionary thought.  For instance, TMT posits that 
individuals with high self-esteem respond less to MS induction than do individuals with 
low self-esteem because high self-esteem essentially acts as a barometer for how well an 
individual has fused his identity with his prevailing cultural milieu.  Coalition 
psychology, on the other hand, argues that self-esteem buffers against the effects of MS 
because it is indicative of the likelihood of support an individual can expect to receive 
from his in-group.  In other words, the likelihood of coalition support is directly 
correlated with one’s self-esteem.  
Interestingly, coalition psychology has also been applied to the study of political 
science, especially with regard to international relations (Lopez, McDermott & 
Petersen, 2011).  Researchers have been able to take the ideas found in coalitional 
psychology and apply them, at a macro level, to the operations of nation-states (Lopez 
et al., 2011).  Thus, issues usually studied at the small group level, such as coalition 
formation and maintenance, resource allocation, group status and hierarchy, are, 
according to some international relations researchers, also applicable in explaining 
behavior at the nation-state level. 
Another theoretical approach with tenets very similar to those found in coalition 
psychology and, by extension, also offering a more parsimonious explanation for the 
                                                                                                                                               
enabled/s humans to pass down important knowledge concerning the most efficient way to survive in a 
given environment, thus increasing the odds their genes will survive into the next generation.  He also 
theorizes that cultural differentiation, to include the development of unique languages, was helpful to 
ancestral humans in that it helped sustain group cohesion by controlling the input of unwanted or 
potentially unhelpful cultural impetuses from outside cultures. 
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effects of mortality salience, is “evolutionary leadership theory” (van Vugt & Ahuga, 
2011).  Evolutionary leadership theory (ELT) approaches the study of leadership from a 
perspective incorporating the tenets of evolutionary psychology, which asserts humans 
evolved as group-living social animals.  Given that humans are social animals 
acculturated by group living, ELT proposes both leadership and followership had to 
develop in order to allow human groupings to efficiently make choices involving life 
and death, and not deteriorate as a result of constant inter-personal conflict.  
Seemingly simple matters, such as which direction to move in order to find 
water or avoid an external threat in the ancestral environment, would easily have 
doomed a human group if not for the obvious existence of leadership and followership 
roles in human groups (Van Vugt, Hogan & Kaiser, 2008).  ELT assumes well-led 
groups in the ancestral environment that could efficiently move, find food and water, 
and act in unison against external threats, would be more effective and adaptive than 
groups riddled with conflict and ambiguity over who should lead and who should 
follow.
5
  Therefore, ELT is interested in exploring the mechanics of how this 
coordination between individuals in groups is negotiated in various social modalities.
6
 
ELT takes a very broad and comprehensive view of leadership in that it 
incorporates diverse disciplines such as biology, anthropology, neuroscience, 
                                                 
5
  The anthropologist, Christopher Boehm, in his book, Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of 
Egalitarian Behavior, notes that most of the indigenous hunter-gatherer societies that have been studied 
were highly egalitarian.  In these societies, leadership was often fluid, depending on the task at hand, and 
any overt posturing by an individual in order to gain an advantage was quickly (and usually harshly) met 
with resistance from the rest of the group.  Boehm called this tendency of the weak to keep the strong in 
check, a “reverse dominance hierarchy,” and strongly undermines the traditional notion of a unitary alpha 
male being the evolutionary adaptive model of leadership. 
 
6
  Interestingly, research cited by Goleman, et al. (2002) in their book, “Primal Leadership”, notes the 
existence of contagious emotions that occur between humans in close groups.  These contagious 
emotions, resulting from the “open-loop limbic system,” would also have been very helpful in 
coordinating group action during both crises and pro-social activity. 
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psychology and organizational behavior, among others.  Given the complexity of 
human behavior and varieties of human social and cultural environments, ELT 
researchers understand it takes a multi-disciplinary approach to illuminate and describe 
the various processes involved in human leadership.  ELT also relies on these diverse 
disciplines to help put into perspective how human behavior is affected by our ancestral 
past. 
For instance, the use of the Big Five personality test (Costa & McCrae, 1992) 
shows that extraversion is strongly related to leadership potential (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & 
Gerhardt, 2002).  ELT research has shown that those first to act in situations are 
generally thought of as leaders, and extraversion is generally a trait correlated with 
individuals who move first in coordination games (van Vugt, 2006).  Previous 
leadership research has also revealed tall individuals are more likely to assume 
leadership positions, a phenomenon explained by ELT resulting from the natural 
inclination of individuals in ancestral environments to look toward taller persons to 




Interestingly, ELT deals briefly with the concept of MS when explaining the 
results of a study that showed individuals preferred a “visionary,” versus a “doer” or 
“peacemaker,” after MS manipulation.  ELT theorists explain that, because MS induces 
                                                 
7
 In support of this analysis, researchers at the University of Utah found that taller individuals, by virtue 
of the increased downward angle they can produce, are generally able to execute a punch with greater 
force than those less vertically inclined.  This would, obviously, give taller men an advantage in physical 
altercations and the ability to provide security.  These attributes, the researchers surmise, may partly 
explain females’ general preference for taller men (Carrier, 2011).   In a more recent study, the Utah 
researchers found evidence that faces of humans may have actually evolved to better absorb punches 




a sort of mortal dread in individuals, they instinctively retreat back to innate responses, 
honed in the ancestral environment where protection from the most trusted person (the 
visionary) would be the most prudent choice to secure one’s safety (van Vugt & Ahuga, 
2011).  
It should also be noted the originators of ELT, when addressing the study using 
MS and leadership styles, did not in any way validate the claims of TMT or its 
psychoanalytic explanations regarding the cognitive mediations MS induces.  Instead, 
they simply provided an explanation that is totally consistent with modern evolutionary 
theory, on which both ELT and Coalitional psychology are based. 
Recall that TMT also asserts the need for distraction exercises in order for MS 
effects to manifest.  Neither coalitional psychology or ELT researchers offer an 
explanation for this phenomenon; however, the work of Stanovich and West (2000) 
may provide an intriguing alternative.  Stanovich and West posit that we have mental 
operations categorized as “system 1” and “system 2.”  This idea of a dual-processing 
cognitive system was later popularized by Nobel Laureate psychologist Daniel 
Kahneman in his book, Thinking Fast and Slow (2011) and seems to offer a more 
parsimonious explanation for the effects of MS versus the proximal and distal 
operations cited by TMT theorists.  Kahneman described System 1 as a cognitive 
system that automatically and constantly updates one’s interpretation of environmental 
reality and is characterized by, among other things, associative thinking.  System 2, in 
contrast, is a more goal-directed cognitive system in that it involves the purposeful 
allocation of attention to various mental activities, to include the purposeful or logical 
analysis of one’s environmental reality.  Although the cognitive machinations involved 
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with System 1 are believed to be shared with many other animals, it is believed the suite 
of cognitive abilities associated with System 2 have only recently evolved with Homo 
sapiens (Stanovich & West, 2000).  Given this explanation, it is likely that the need for 
a distraction exercise after MS represents the need for death awareness to be moved 
from System 2 operations, where logical analysis of one’s environment takes place, into 
System 1, where automatic mental heuristics are initiated in response to environmental 
prompts or stimuli.  In this case, MS likely represents a potentially mortal 
environmental stimulus, and reactions to it, such as coalescing more strongly with one’s 
in-group, or disparaging an out-group, are representative of an automatic mental 
heuristic typical of a System 1 response.  
Decoupling mortality salience from TMT.  As previously mentioned, criticism 
of TMT by social science researchers has steadily grown, many of them citing logical 
inconsistencies inherent in its theoretical foundations.  These criticisms generally, but 
not exclusively, focus on TMT’s perceived misuse of evolutionary theory.  And, as 
noted above, there are researchers who have offered more parsimonious explanations 
for the effects of MS, grounding the resulting phenomenon more firmly in modern 
evolutionary theory.  A more secure grounding in evolutionary theory would be 
extremely beneficial because it would give the phenomenon greater predictive and 
explanatory force.  It would also allow MS to be used in cross-disciplinary research and 
academic endeavors not necessarily adhering to the tenets of analytic psychology.  
Given these circumstances, it seems logical that both the concept and phenomenon of 
MS should be decoupled from TMT’s exclusive jurisdiction and freed for use with other 
academic theories and disciplines. 
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For instance, from a scientific research point of view, it would seem more useful 
if MS was available to study a variety of environments where mortality is generally 
expected to be salient, such as hospitals, emergency response sites, court rooms (i.e., the 
litigation of murder cases and the effects on juries), or forward operating bases in 
combat zones.  In addition, an explanation of the effects of MS would be better suited in 
theories more adequately grounded in mainstream evolutionary thought, such as those 
found in coalition psychology or evolutionary leadership theory.  Once firmly nestled in 
more logical foundations, MS would likely prove to be a more cogent (and widely used) 
tool in which to study the various modalities of cognitive functioning as mediated by 
the experience of working in death salient environments.
8
  
Measuring the cognitive and neurological effects of mortality salience.  
There have been many TMT studies showing the effects of MS on behavior, the 
majority showing that MS induction increases the likelihood individuals will display or 
communicate more favorable evaluations of their cultural worldview while giving 
unfavorable evaluations to those possessing dissimilar cultural worldviews.  For the 
purpose of this study, the traditional behavioral level of analysis, explored in many prior 
TMT-based studies, was abandoned for a research designed more focused on how MS 
influences basic neurocognitive processes, particularly information recall performance, 
attentional switching, and neurocognitive processing speed.  It is these basic abilities 
involving memory recall, attentional switching, and processing speed that are some of 
the most important regarding a human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors’ ability to 
                                                 
8
 As a consistent theoretical approach is solidified and advanced, mortality salience research may lend 
itself to a vast array of disciplines not immediately understood as having relevance.  For instance, it is 
logical to assume continued MS would mediate the economic development of areas where tribal or ethnic 
violence is ubiquitous, in that security and defense-related concerns would likely take precedence over 
concerns relating to human capital development. 
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quickly and efficiently perform their duties while deployed in a military combat zone.  
Further, by decoupling MS from TMT and focusing on basic neurocognitive functions, 
alternative schemas for MS can be operationalized.  If MS can be freed from the 
intellectual bounds of TMT, the dynamics of MS may be seen as better paralleling the 
generalized dynamics of anxiety.  Given there is robust research indicating anxiety 
biases attention much in the same way as MS, i.e., toward threat-related information 
(M. Eysenck et al., 2007), it is logical to assume MS-induced student participants would 
remember threatening-related information to a greater degree than neutral information.  
Attentional control theory.  One of the more contemporary and promising 
theories addressing the effects of anxiety on cognition is Attentional Control Theory 
(M. Eysenck et al., 2007).  Attentional control theory (ACT) is an extension of Eysenck 
and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory.  Updated with several new theoretical 
propositions, ACT includes the concepts of attentional effectiveness and efficiency. 
Attentional effectiveness addresses the quality of one’s attentional task 
performance, as measured by a number of cognitive tests.  Efficiency refers to the 
relationship between the quality of attentional performance and the amount of cognitive 
effort required to maintain that quality, and, for the purposes of this research project, is 
the concept of which I will be mostly concerned.  With regard to understanding 
processing efficiency, a crude analogy would be two identical vehicles, one being 
perfectly tuned, the other operating with dirty filters and old sparkplugs.  Obviously, if 
both were traveling the same distance at the same speed, the highly tuned vehicle would 
require less gas because it would be operating much more efficiently than the un-tuned 
vehicle, as the dirty filters and old sparkplugs would place an additional load on the 
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engine.  Similarly, one’s attentional system can operate more efficiently if performance 
is not hindered by added demands, such as anxiety, fatigue, distraction, etc.   
As ACT is concerned with the effects of anxiety on processing efficiency, it 
should be noted the theory utilizes Power and Dalgleish’s (1997) view that anxiety is 
caused when the attainment of a current goal is threatened.  Eysenck et al. (2007) also 
assume, if a goal is threatened, anxiety is facilitative in initiating one’s environmental 
scanning protocol in order to determine who or what is responsible for posing the threat.  
Therefore, according to ACT, anxious individuals would deploy a greater degree of 
their attentional resources towards scanning the environment for threat-related stimuli.  
A person engaged in a particular task, who also becomes anxious as a result of a 
subsequent threat, may not show any decrease in their attentional effectiveness while 
performing their original activity.  However, given the additional cognitive resources 
needed to sustain their attentional effectiveness on the task, it is likely their attentional 
efficiency would be decreased.  In other words, an environmental threat may not 
necessarily decrease the effectiveness of attentional performance; however, the 
additional cognitive resources deployed to determine the nature of the threat, likely 
leads to degradation in the efficiency of the attentional system.   
Operationally, ACT researchers have used various instruments to assess the 
attentional system (M. Eysenck et al., 2007).  Notably among them is the Stroop test, 
which evaluates processing speed, selective attention, interference, and executive 
functioning.  Similarly, switching tasks have also been used to assess the fundamental 
neurocognitive functioning of a person to allocate resources back and forth between 
tasks, a process that can be vulnerable to added interference, such as evoked anxiety.   
17 
It should also be pointed out that ACT assumes an attentional system comprised of 
both a “top-down,” goal-directed attentional system, and a “bottom up,” stimulus-driven 
attentional system, as described by Corbett and Shulman (2002).  The goal-directed 
system is influenced by one’s expectations, experience, and goals, while the stimulus-
driven attentional system is propelled by stimuli that are salient and/or potentially 
threatening.  ACT asserts that anxiety disrupts the equilibrium between the stimulus-
driven and goal-directed attentional systems.  It does this by increasing the influence of 
the stimulus-driven system, which is mobilized to detect and process threat-related 
stimuli in the environment, a zero-sum process that operates to the detriment of the 
goal-directed system.  This characterization of the attentional system is important in 
understanding why ACT hypothesizes that anxiety impairs processing efficiency on 
tasks involving the inhibition function, especially those involving threat-related stimuli. 
Given the above discussion, the purpose of this study was to explore how MS 
mediates key aspects of neurocognitive functioning and behavior relevant to a human 
intelligence collector’s ability to operate in lethal environments.  In addition to the 
evidence suggesting MS influences cognition in a manner similar to anxiety (Gauthier, 
2011) and in conjunction with the evidence suggesting this influence appears to lead to 
selective attention toward information relevant to self-survival, it is possible that 
anxiety may compromise a HUMINT collector’s ability to fully perceive and remember 
vital information regarding strategic enemy characteristics.  Therefore, because the 
effects of anxiety on attentional control can be measured by tests assessing inhibitory 
function , attentional switching, as well as instruments assessing attentional bias, i.e., 
recall (M. Eysenck et al., 2007), the expectation was that it would be possible to use 
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these tests to assess the influence of MS on HUMINT collectors’ neurocognitive 
functioning.  With these assumptions in mind, the major research questions in this study 
were:  1) What effect does MS have on inhibitory function, as measured by the Stroop 
test?  2) What effect does MS have on attentional switching?  3) What effect does MS 
have on simple reaction time?  4) What effect does MS have on memory recall of 
intelligence information when personally-threatening, strategic and neutral modalities 
of information are presented verbally?  All four of the previous questions were explored 
using a between-subjects experimental design, and it was predicted that MS induction 
would negatively influence one’s inhibitory efficiency, degrade one’s ability to switch 
attention, degrade simple reaction time, and increase one’s attentional bias to 
personally-threatening material, thus increasing the memory recall performance of 
information deemed most important for one’s immediate survival.  
Methodology 
Participants 
A total of 107 students (73 female) from a major Midwestern research university 
participated in this study.  Data from 12 students was discarded due to technical errors 
during data collection.  Students ranged in age from 18-25 (M=19.5, SD=1.18) and all 
were enrolled in introductory psychology courses.  Participants were recruited from the 
psychology department’s subject pool and were allotted research participation hours or 
extra credit for their participation.  All volunteer student participants had the option of 




For this study, the “simple reaction time,” “switching” and “Stroop” subtests of 
the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM4™) were utilized, as 
well as a memory recall instrument that incorporated an intelligence gathering scenario, 
specifically designed to explore MS’s influence on attentional bias.  ANAM4™ is a 
computer-based neuropsychological assessment tool that can measure various cognitive 
functions, such as reaction time, attention, and general cognitive ability.  Each 
computer-based test can be rapidly administered and includes a “practice mode” to 
ensure participants understand the test.  The “practice mode” is followed by a “test 
mode” in which the actual recorded test data trials are administered.  It is also a very 
germane instrument for research with applicability to the military community, given it 
was initially designed to be used with the military and was subsequently employed to 
test military-relevant topics such as cognitive baseline performance prior to deployment 
(Vincent et al., 2012), traumatic brain injury (Warden et al., 2001), environmental toxin 
exposure (Kane et al., 1996) and stressful environments (Harris et al., 2005). 
The simple reaction time (SRT) test of the ANAM4
TM
 is considered one of the 
most fundamental human performance measures and is quick and easy to administer.  
Simple reaction time is measured by having participants respond to the presence of an 
asterisk “*” on their computer screen as quickly as they can, by pressing a button on 
their computer mouse.  The dependent measure used for analysis was reaction time 
(RT) in milliseconds.  Previous research exploring anxiety’s effects on SRT have been 
mixed.  (Faber & Spence, 1956) found no effects from anxiety on SRT, while 
(Nishisato, 1966) found trait anxiety did increase SRT. 
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Following the work of Eysenck et al. (2007), there is much evidence indicating 
anxiety impairs processing efficiency as well as, in many cases, performance 
effectiveness on tasks involving the shifting (switching) function.  Prior research by 
Miyake et al (2000) determined that the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) is a 
reliable instrument to test the shifting function of the central executive.  However, I 
used the “switching” subtest of the ANAM4
TM
, as it is automated, takes far less time to 
administer, and has been shown to correlate highly with the WCST (Faneros, 2014). 
The “switching” subtest of the ANAM4™ is a computerized instrument 
consisting of the ANAM4™ “manikin test” and the “mathematical processing test.”  
The “manikin test” is used to assess spatial-rotation ability by asking subjects to state in 
which hand (left or right) a computerized manikin is holding a ball.  The math test 
includes simple addition or subtraction problem.  Subjects were presented with a screen 
showing one test at a time, and at random periods, would shift from one test to the 
other.  The dependent measure used for analysis in this task was the “throughput,” 
which measures the number of correct responses divided by the response time in 
minutes.  
     The “Stroop” subtest of the ANAM4™ measures processing speed, selective 
attention, interference, and executive function.  The test assesses these functions by 
presenting participants with a series of black blocks on a computer screen.  The blocks 
will generally consist of the names of a color, such as “red”, “green”, and “blue”, but 
spelled in a font of a different color.  Having participants indicate which color is 
spelled, versus the color of the font in which it is written, gives a measure of their 
ability to inhibit prepotent responses.  The dependent measure used for analysis was the 
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“Subset Level 3 Interference Score,” which is the typical outcome score used for the 
Stroop and captures the number of items correct minus the “PredCWScore.”   
Finally, following a meta-analysis performed by Mitte (2008) there is a robust 
amount of research indicating higher anxious persons have a greater tendency to recall 
threatening material.  Given this theoretical foundation, it was logical to assume an 
individual induced with mortality salience, would be more apt to remember information 
relevant to their own (personal) safety versus information considered more strategic in 
nature and less germane to their immediate survival or safety.  With this in mind, a 
three-minute video was developed portraying a friendly intelligence source in military 
gear being recorded in what looked like a remote cave.  The video contained 30 data 
points used to assess memory recall.  Of the 30 data points, 10 were “strategic” (e.g., 
enemy plans, logistics and strategy) 10 were “personally-threatening” (e.g., information 
on aspects of the immediate environment that pose life endangering threat), and 10 were 
“neutral” (e.g., information that is neither personally-threatening nor strategic in 
nature). 
Procedure 
All testing took place in a psychological testing laboratory suite of rooms in a 
department of psychology in a large, Midwestern research university.  Participants were 
recruited through an online experimental participant recruitment system.  Participants 
were run in groups of two to five participants.  I utilized a between-subjects 
experimental design and the recruited participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three groups:  a Mortality Salience induction group (MS), a Dental Pain Salience 
induction group (DPS) and a non-mortality/dental pain salience induction Control group 
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(CTL).  The DPS has been used in MS research (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010) as 
an additional control group to assess the possible effect of a non-anxiety–producing 
self-referent episode having a similar effect to MS.  All participants were given 
informed consent forms regarding the study prior to testing and told they could 
discontinue their participation at any time during the study for any reason. 
As each group of participants arrived, they were welcomed and given a short 
description of the overall study and their informed consent forms.  The participants 
were told the study in which they were agreeing to participate was designed to 
investigate cognitive responses during intelligence collection activity.  
Prior to the session, each group was assigned, through block-randomization, to 
one of the three comparison groups, i.e., MS, DPS, or CTL.  After each group was 
settled into the lab, they were induced with one of the following three protocols.  The 
MS group was induced with mortality salience by spending 10 min writing down on 
paper what they believe happens to their physical body after they die, which is the most 
common protocol used in previous MS induction experiments (Greenberg et al., 1990).  
The participants assigned to the DPS group were asked to write a 10-min description of 
the worst dental pain they have ever experience.  This is also a common control 
protocol for previous mortality salience research.  Finally, the CTL group participants 
were asked to write a 10-min description of their most favorite automobile, a control 
technique utilized for its putative emotive neutrality.  At the conclusion of the 10-min 
induction period, the respective MS, DTL, and CTL participants were asked to spend 
five min on an elementary-level cross-word puzzle, an exercise traditionally used to 
ensure MS is out of the focal consciousness of the MS group participants.   
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After completing work on the crossword puzzle for five min, respective group 
participants were instructed to log on to the computers at their workstations and 
complete the “practice mode” of the ANAM4
TM
 SRT test.  When all participants noted 
they felt comfortable with their ability to efficiently conduct the first ANAM4
TM
 test, 
they were asked to complete the “test mode” of the SRT.  After completing the SRT, 
participants either took the SWT or the STR for their second test, as dictated by a 
randomization schedule.  Following the second ANAM4
TM
 test, participants were led 
into a darkened room where the video portion of the HUMINT Recall Test was shown.  
The video lasted approximately three min.  After watching the video portion of the 
HUMINT Recall Test, and before being instructed to recall any data from the video, 
participant groups were led back into the main testing room and asked to complete the 
“practice mode” of the third ANAM4
TM
 (either the SWT or STR) test followed by the 
“test mode” of the third ANAM4
TM
 test.  After completing the third ANAM4
TM
 test, 
participants in the group were asked to spend five min recalling as many data-points 
from the HUMINT source video as possible.  The delay in attempting to recall data 
from the video simulated the lag HUMINT collectors would likely experience between 
the time they procured verbal data from a clandestine source and the subsequent 
opportunity to inconspicuously notate it.  Thus, although the SWT and STR tests were 
given in random order across groups, the video portion of the HUMINT Recall Test was 
always administered in-between the second and third ANAM
TM
 tests.  The recall 
portion of the HUMINT Recall Test was always completed last.  
Results 
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There were four different sets of analyses performed for this study.  First, the 
study examined the effects of mortality salience on memory recall items.  Additionally, 
analyses were performed on the effects of mortality salience utilizing three separate 
ANAM4TM performance tests: Simple Reaction Time (SRT), Attentional Switching 
(SWT), and Stroop (STR). 
Memory Recall Test 
The Memory Recall Test consisted of 30 total data points, 10 points for each of 
the three categories: neutral, strategic, and personally-threatening.  A scoring sheet was 
constructed with each item being assigned a numeric value.  Participant recall sheets 
were analyzed by two independent raters, assigned scores based on the scoring sheet, 
and averaged.  Inter-rater reliability for the neutral item scoring was very high based on 
an interclass correlation coefficient at .97.  Inter-rater reliability for the strategic and 
personally-threatening items were also high based on interclass correlation coefficients 
of .98.   
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted in 
order to determine if there were any statistically significant group differences between 
mean scores for the three treatments groups, (CTL, N = 32), (DPS, N = 31), (MS, N = 
32) across the three dependent recall variable item types.  The three recall item types 
included the following: neutral items (N_Score), personally-threatening items 
(P_Score), and strategic items, (S_Score).  
The one-way MANOVA revealed a statistically significant difference exists 
between the three treatment groups, F (6, 180) = 2.60, p = .019.  There does not appear 
to be any extreme outliers in any group (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1.  Shows the number of outliers in each group analyzed using a multivariate analysis of 
variance in order to determine any significant group differences in mean scores.  Extreme 
outliers are denoted by an asterisk (*) 
In order to determine which dependent variable was responsible for the 
difference in mean scores between the three treatment groups, three separate ANOVAs 
were conducted.  The ANOVA between treatment groups of recalled neutral items was 
not statistically significant, F (2, 92) = 2.2, p = .114.  The ANOVA between treatment 
groups of recalled personally-threatening items was not statistically significant, F (2, 
92) = 2.28, p = .108.  Finally, the ANOVA of recalled strategic items revealed a 
statistically significant difference between the three treatment groups, F (2, 92) = 3.74, 
p = .027. 
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A Tukey post hoc analysis was subsequently conducted and revealed the 
difference in mean strategic recall item scores between the CTL and MS groups to be 
statistically significant, (p = .048).  The difference between the CTL group and DPS 
group was not statistically significant, (p = .998).  Additionally, the difference between 
the DPS and MS treatment groups approached significance, but was not statistically 
significant (p = .057).   
 
Figure 2.  Shows a comparison between the mean strategic recall item scores of the CTL, DPS, 





It was hypothesized that if more global measures of recall were influenced by 
MS, then more discrete measures of human performance or cognitive efficiency might 
reveal more subtle differences consistent with the literature on the disruptive effects of 
anxiety (see Eysenck, 2007).  There were three ANAM4
TM
 performance tests (Simple 
Reaction Time, Switching, and Stroop) used in order to determine if mortality salience 
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affected specific aspects of motor performance or cognitive efficiency.  Also, because 
rapid and brief performance tests can produce extreme outliers, the data for the ANAM 
tests were assessed for outliers.  The criterion for an extreme outlier was any value 
greater than 3 box-lengths from the edge of the box.   
Simple reaction time (SRT).  Simple reaction time (SRT) is one of the most 
fundamental human performance measures.  Many believe it forms a component of 
most other complex responses that use increasing levels of cognition.  The ANAM4
TM
 
SRT test was included to determine if MS influences human performance at this more 
fundamental information processing level.  A one-way ANOVA was employed to 
determine if there was a significant difference between the comparison groups.  The 
dependent measure was reaction time, which was measured in milliseconds.  Because 
brief performance tests often produce extreme outliers, the data for the ANAM4
TM
 was 
assessed for outliers.  There were no extreme outliers as assessed by boxplot.  SRT 
scores for the CTL, DPS and MS groups are presented in Figure 3.  Although the MS 
group scores indicated longer reaction times, as predicted, the difference between the 




Figure 3.  Shows a comparison between mean Simple Reaction Time (SRT) scores of CTL, 
DPS and MS treatment groups.   
Attentional switching test (SWT).  The switching (SWT) test was included in 
this study because of its ability to assess both directed attention and executive 
functioning.  Again, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was a 
significant difference between comparison groups.  Like the above example, subjects 
were classified into 3 groups; control (CTL), dental pain salience (DPS), and mortality 
salience (MS).  Number correct divided by min (throughput) was the dependent 
variable.  There were no extreme outliers in any of the treatment groups, as assessed by 
boxplot.  SWT scores increased from DS group (M = 22.7, SD = 7.2) to the CTL group 
(M = 23, SD = .8), to MS (M = 23.5, SD = 7.9), in that order (see Figure 4).  Contrary to 
predictions, the mortality salience group appeared to have less interference with regard 
to the ability to shift attention; however, the difference between treatment groups was 
not statistically significant F (2, 92) = .093, p = .912.  
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Figure 4.  Shows a comparison between the means Switching (SWT) scores of the CTL, DPS 
and MS treatment groups. 
STROOP test (STR).  Finally, the Stoop Test was utilized in this study for its 
ability to assess processing speed, selective attention, interference, and executive 
functioning.  A third one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was a 
significant difference between comparison groups.  Again, as in the above example, 
subjects were classified into 3 groups, control (CTL), dental pain salience (DPS), and 
mortality salience (MS), with reaction times measured in milliseconds.  There was one 
extreme outlier in the (DPS) group that was discarded, as well as one outlier in the (MS) 
group.  Additionally, one score in the (CTL) group was lost due to a technical error.  
STR scores increased from MS group (M = 16.6, SD = 7.83) to the CTL group (M = 
18.72, SD = 7.72), to DS (M = 23.26, SD = 9.96), in that order (see Figure 5).  The 
difference between the MS group and DS group was statistically significant, F (2, 89) = 
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3.5, p = .034.  The difference between the CTL and MS group and the difference 
between the CTL and DPS group were not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 5.  Shows the difference in mean Stroop (STR) scores between the CTL, DS and MS 
treatment groups. 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to gain a greater understanding of the cognitive 
challenges of human intelligence collection in lethal environments.  The aim was to 
potentially incorporate any insights from this research into organizational leadership 
efficiencies within the United States Intelligence Community.  Simulating cognitive 
processes similar to those likely found while collecting intelligence in a combat zone 
was accomplished using mortality salience (MS), a tool generally utilized in Terror 
Management Theory research and known to influence specific aspects of psycho-social 
behavior.  Given prior research has shown MS influences behavior in ways similar to 
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state anxiety, the expectation was MS would disrupt attentional processing as predicted 
by Attentional Control Theory (M. Eysenck et al., 2007).  Attentional Control Theory 
(ACT) proposes that anxiety degrades the efficiency of attentional processing; 
therefore, after MS induction, it was expected these degradations could be measured 
using instruments designed to assess cognitive performance and memory recall skills of 
the same types generally utilized in intelligence gathering situations.  Consistent with 
expectations, results indicated MS influenced cognitive performance and memory recall 
ability, although not quite in the direction as predicted.  
MS was found to influence the ability of subjects to recall items from the mock 
intelligence source video to a statistically significant degree, although the influence was 
inconsistent with expectations in that it occurred with “strategic,” not “personally-
threatening” recall items.  “Personally-threatening” recall items were hypothesized to be 
recalled at a higher rate than either “strategic” or “neutral” recall items based on a meta-
analysis performed by Mitte (2008) who asserted that subjects with higher rates of 
anxiety tend to remember personally-threatening material at increased rates.  The result 
in the present study that “strategic” recall items were remembered at greater rates, 
although unanticipated, may have several logical explanations.   
First, given the majority of subjects were tested in groups, it is possible the 
dynamics of coalitional psychology were at play and influenced the recall of data.  For 
instance, coalitional psychology theorizes that evolution would favor groups who better 
coordinate reactions to threats and crisis situations (Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006); 
therefore, it is logical to assume these dynamics may also be in play with regard to 
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remembering the type of information (i.e., strategic), that would best assist in group 
survival.   
If one assumes MS mimics the cognitive processes associated with identifying a 
potentially lethal threat from the environment, and remembering “strategic” threat 
information would best serve the overall protection and ultimate survival of the group, it 
is logical to assume the dynamics of coalitional psychology would support an increased 
ability to remember strategic modalities of information.    
An additional explanation for this confounding factor in the results includes the 
possibility that MS supports an increased ability to remember information that is more 
relevant to the survival of the group and the individual, keeping in mind the ability to 
remember “personally-threatening” information under the MS condition approached 
significance (p = .057).  This line of reasoning is supported by the apparent decrease in 
the number of “neutral” recall items recalled by the MS group, as opposed to the CTL 
group, although the decrease was not statistically significant (p =  .114).   
Examining MS effects on cognitive efficiency was performed by utilizing the 
Simple Reaction Time (SRT), Attentional Switching (SWT), and Stroop (STR) tests of 
the ANAM4
TM
.  As previously stated, ANAM4
TM
 tests were included to assess the 
more fundamental cognitive processes that may underlie intelligence gathering, 
especially those that correspond to the known effects of anxiety on attentional control.  
It was believed that the Attentional Control task and the Stroop task might be useful in 
this regard, and the SRT task was added during test protocol development because it is 
useful in broader terms for preparing participants for ANAM4
TM
 test performance and 
fundamental to so many cognitive tasks.  Although no prior predictions were stated for 
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SRT, SRT results trended toward indications that subjects induced with MS have slower 
response times than either the CTL or DPS treatment groups, as would be expected.      
This apparent trend toward longer response times after MS induction is 
consistent with the negative effects of anxiety on cognitive processing theorized by 
Eysenck, 2007.  Given this finding, future research should investigate this effect 
incorporating greater statistical power obtained through utilizing a higher N, providing 
participants more extensive practice on SRT to gain more asymptotic performance and 
reduce variability, or perhaps use alternative tests of SRT such as choice RT where 
some degree of cognitive function is included.  Also, in light of these results, it would 
be interesting to investigate mortality salience effects on auditory and olfactory 
efficiency to determine if MS influences perceptual abilities.  This proposal stems from 
the assumption inherent in attentional control theory that, when an individual perceives 
a threat in the environment and subsequently experiences anxiety, their attentional 
resources are more broadly allocated, thereby increasing their chances of determining 
its locus.  
Next, the ANAM4
TM
 attentional switching (SWT) test was used to investigate 
MS effects on the ability to switch attention between stimuli.  There were no 
statistically significant differences; however, the MS group trended toward less 
interference than both the DPS and CTL groups.  This finding was contrary to 
expectations given MS was predicted to interfere with cognitive performance.  Many 
participants showed signs of tension while trying to determine the spatial orientation of 
the ball held by the manikins which may have influenced the results in some manner.  
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Finally, an examination was conducted to determine if MS influenced cognitive 
performance as measured by the Stoop test.  The results were again unexpected, albeit 
interesting, in that the only statistically significant group differences were between the 
MS and DPS groups.  The difference between the MS and CTL group was not 
statistically significant.  However, the morphology of the differences suggests that 
dental pain salience (DPS) may have acted to increase cognitive efficiency, while MS, 
as attentional control theory suggests, interferes with cognitive processing.  Future 
research investigating the cause of DPS influence in cognitive performance, including 
whether or not a distraction exercise is needed to initiate System 2 processes, would be 
interesting.  
The results of this research indicate MS influences both memory recall and 
cognitive performance.  Although some of the results were unexpected, they do beg for 
additional research in order to provide greater granularity regarding the locus of the 
effects.  It is interesting to note that the two tests where statistically-significant results 
were found involved memory recall and Stroop, both of which would be expected to 
require more cognitive resources to negotiate than either the SWT or SRT.  This finding 
is consistent with a major tenet of attentional control theory that asserts that anxiety 
decreases attentional efficiency as cognitive demands from tasks increase.   
Additionally, these findings, coupled with over thirty years of TMT research 
showing MS influences psycho-social behavior, (although utilizing a questionable 
theoretical framework), provide strong support for the existence of what could be 
referred to as a “mortality bias (MB).”  Because it is logical to assume that the human 
attentional system would become energized after MS (i.e., a potentially lethal threat 
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stimuli from the environment) in order to more quickly decipher the locus of the 
potential threat and increase survivability, the existence of a mortality bias would seem 
to increase the probability of survival.  Allowing the effects of MS to be classified into 
more theoretically-sound schema utilizing commonly-accepted scientific nomenclature, 
as found in evolutionary leadership theory, evolutionary-based cognitive bias or 
coalitional psychology research, would give the phenomenon more explanatory and 
predictive force.  As such, it is unlikely TMT would have a parsimonious explanation 
for the statistically-significant results found in this study as it traditionally is concerned 
with MS effects at the behavioral level.  Conceptualizing the effects of MS as a 
mortality bias would provide a more cogent and unified explanation whether at the 
neurological or behavioral level.    
In conclusion, additional research into the areas described above may provide 
valuable insight into the cognitive processes critical for intelligence collection in lethal 
environments.  Increased insight regarding MS effects on the group dynamics (as it 
relates to cognitive processing) of teams collecting intelligence in combat zones may 
help save lives and increase the efficiency of the overall intelligence enterprise.  In 
other words, as this project suggests, if individuals operating in teams are better able to 
recall strategic information in lethal environments, should they then be trained to pay 
greater attention to personally-threatening information?  Also, further research into the 
disruptive effects of MS on cognitive processing, as highlighted in this project, may 
help temper the expectations of HUMINT leaders regarding task demands.  As such, 
keeping operational expectations reasonable regarding intelligence collection missions 
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in combat zones may help prevent burnout or other decrements associated with 
unrealistically high cognitive loads.     
Also, a more robust understanding of these processes may add insight into the 
evolution of human cognitive development, and, by extension, a better understanding of 
the human experience.  Additionally, as these results are consistent with the theoretical 
foundations proposed in Attentional Control Theory, Coalitional Psychology, and 
contemporary understandings of cognitive bias, there is greater justification to decouple 
MS from Terror Management Theory.  Once decoupled, MS could begin to be utilized 
as a research tool in a wide variety of cognitive and social science domains whose 
theoretical foundations may be more viable than those found in Terror Management 
Theory.   
If, as Haselton et al., (2015) propose, a cognitive bias occurs when human 
cognitive processes “…reliably [produce] representations that are systematically 
distorted compared to some aspect of objective reality,” the results of this project, 
combined with 30 years of TMT research, suggests  mortality salience effects may be 
more consistent with those of an evolutionary-adaptive “cognitive bias.”  Perhaps 
utilizing more precise terminology such as “mortality bias,” grounded in theories with 
greater explanatory force, would increase multi-disciplinary research regarding the 
effects of mortality salience, and, by extension, a better understanding of the human 
attentional system.  Incorporating the use of the term “mortality bias” into the scientific 
nomenclature may also remove the stigma associated with TMT, a theory many believe 
to be theoretically unsound, while encouraging a wider cohort of researchers to explore 
this fascinating phenomenon.  Regardless, the hope is the findings in this research will 
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constitute a small step toward a greater understanding of the human attentional system 
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Appendix A: HUMINT Memory Recall Video Script 
Data points 1 – 15 
Neutral 
- N1: The village you are in is called “Little Detroit” by the enemy. 
- N2: I apologize for the rapid nature of this briefing; I haven’t had time to 
organize my notes. 
- N3: You have probably noticed we have had exceptionally rainy weather these 
last two weeks. 
- N4: Most of the farmers are saying it’s going to be an exceptionally long winter. 
- N5: I may have to skip our next meeting as I will be traveling to New Delhi for 
my cousin’s wedding. 
Personally Threatening 
- P1: Avoid using taxis while in country, the enemy has been using them to lure 
Americans to kidnap and torture. 
- P2: When you leave, avoid the hospital road; the enemy may have placed deadly 
explosives there. 
- P3: Avoid taking blankets from local villagers; the enemy has been giving 
blankets infected with small pox to our forces. 
- P4: Be cautious when driving past dead animals; the enemy has been placing 
explosives in them. 
- P5: Your cover may have been blown; a stranger was in the village earlier 
asking about the presence of Americans. 
Strategic 
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- P1: There has been an increase in enemy activity around this village. 
- P2: It was too dangerous for me to come and visit you in person. 
- P3: The enemy uses rainy weather as cover to move explosives thru the 
mountains. 
- P4: Russian President Putin may be about to introduce a peace plan between the 
Americans and the terrorists. 
- P5: Long winters are good because the enemy generally stays in the mountains 
and decreases their attacks. 
--- Script Part I --- 
 Hello, sorry I couldn’t meet you in person today, there has been an increase in 
enemy activity near the village
S1
, and it was too dangerous for me to travel.
S2   
By the 
way, the village you are operating in today is called “Little Detroit” by the enemy.
N1   
Speaking of Detroit, you should avoid using taxis while you are in this country, the 
enemy has been using them to lure Americans to kidnap and torture.
P1
  
 Also, when you leave the village today, avoid the hospital road; we have 
information the enemy may have placed deadly explosive barrels there.
P2
  
 I apologize for the rapid-fire nature of this briefing; I didn’t have time to 
organize my notes before this communication.
N2 
 
Please, do not take any blankets from local villagers; the enemy has been 
distributing blankets infected with small pox to our forces.
P3  
 
 You have probably noticed we have had exceptionally rainy weather these last 
two weeks.
N3





 Be cautions when driving past dead animals in the road, there have been many 
incidents of the enemy placing explosives in them to attack your vehicles.
P4
 




 Oh, by the way, we are hearing rumors that Russian President Putin may be 
about to introduce a peace plan between the Americans and the enemy.
S4
 
 Anyway, long winters are good for us because the enemy stays in the mountains 
and decreases their attacks.
S5
 
Role player indicates he just received some information thru his ear piece 
“I’m sorry what? OK.” 
 I just received information that your cover may have been blown as there was a 
stranger in your village inquiring about the presence of Americans.
P5
 
 Before I forget, I may have to skip our next meeting, as I will be traveling to 
New Delhi for my cousin’s wedding.
N5 
 
Data points 16 – 30 
Neutral 
- N6: Jalalabad is my ancestral home and my brother still lives there. 
- N7: You may know I was trained on the use of explosives at a military base in 
Florida. 
- N8: We have many varieties of poisonous and non-poisonous snakes in this 
country. 
- N9: I only have a few more minutes; I am having lunch with my wife today. 
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- N10: I and my fighters are very tired; we haven’t slept properly for weeks. 
Personally Threatening 
- P6: The temporary HQ is being used to plan an attack on your camp with the 
goal of killing or capturing as many Americans as possible. 
- P7: Be cautious with captured enemy cellphones, some of them have had 
explosives placed inside them. 
- P8: If you are operating in Jalalabad, avoid the apple orchards; deadly vipers 
live in the trees and we have no anti-venom to treat the bites. 
- P9: The enemy has been known to use arsenic to poison the local water wells. 
- P10: The road you will be using is watched by enemy fighters and you may be 
targeted. 
Strategic 
- S6: Two days ago, I was told the enemy was setting up a temporary HQ near 
Jalalabad. 
- S7: My brother is working for us as an intelligence source, so please keep this 
information protected. 
- S8: The enemy is becoming very expert with his use of explosives. 
- S9: Don’t be alarmed if you’ve noticed a large number of Chinese men in your 
area; they are coming here to work on a copper mining contract 
- S10: The Chinese use arsenic in their mining operations 
--- Script Part II--- 
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 Jalalabad is my ancestral home and my brother still lives there.
N6
 
 The temporary HQ is being established to plan an attack on your camp, with the 
goal to kill or capture as many Americans as possible.
P6
 




 In fact, he wanted me to tell you that you should be careful with captured enemy 
cell phones, as some of them have had explosives placed in them.
P7 
 The enemy is becoming very expert with his use of explosives.
S8
 




 Incidentally, I should mention that if you are operating in Jalalabad, avoid the 












Don’t be alarmed if you’ve noticed a large number of Chinese men in your area; 




The Chinese use arsenic in their mining operations
S10
, and we’ve asked the 








Take great care as you make your way back to camp today; the road you will be 




























Appendix C: Attitudes Personality Surveys of Mortality, Dental, and Automobile 
Salience Induction Processes 
 
Mortality Attitudes Survey 
In the space below, please spend 10 minutes writing responses to the following 
questions.  Use the back of the sheet if you need more space.  The research assistant 
will tell you when to stop writing. 
 
1) What do you think will happen to you as you physically die and what will 
happen to your body? 
2) Describe the emotions that the thought of your death arouses in you. 
 
Dental Attitudes Personality Survey 
In the space below, please spend the next 10 minutes writing responses to the following 
question(s).  Use the back of the sheet if you need more space.  The research assistant 
will tell you when to stop writing. 
 
1) Describe a situation in which you recall having the worst dental pain? 
2) Describe the emotions that the thought of that dental pain incident arouses in 
you. 
 
Automobile Attitudes Survey 
 
In the space below, please spend the next 10 minutes writing responses to the following 
question(s).  Use the back of the sheet if you need more space.  The research assistant 
will tell you when to stop writing. 
 
1) Describe your favorite automobile including features you like the most. 









Appendix D: Word Search Distraction Exercise 
 
When instructed to begin, please spend 5 minutes finding and circling the words listed 
on the below word search puzzle.  If you finish before the five minutes is up, please go 
back over your work and make sure all the words you circled are spelled correctly.  
 
 
 
